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Part II -- Main Edition -- 16 August 1976

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

BOSTON GLOBE 15 AUGUST 1976 (16) Pg. 12

France steps up defense spending

By R. A. Kidder
Special to The Globe

PARIS — The United States has long complained that its NATO allies have not been doing their fair share in the defense of Western Europe. Now French President Giscard d'Estaing is taking steps to improve that situation as regards his country.

This spring, Giscard's proposal to double the defense budget over the next six years and to modernize and develop France's conventional forces was approved by the Parliament. From 17 percent of the national budget the military budget will be increased, between 1977 and 1982, to 20 percent. This is in response to the French president's concern that steps must be taken in face of "regional and world-wide destabilization."

France has left NATO's integrated command and has no intention of rejoining it, but Giscard recognizes that France's national security depends on European equilibrium and he realizes that the nation must contribute to the security of its allies.

These points are well illustrated by the recent announcement of plans and actions to strengthen the French fleet greatly and to reorient its mission from the Atlantic, based on Brest, to the Mediterranean, based on Toulon. This decision directly interests the US at a time when the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean is being built up rapidly, exceeding the strength of the American Sixth Fleet.

From 1974 to 1977 the French combat fleet in the Mediterranean will have increased from 77,000 tons to 136,000, if current plans continue. When new materials become available, naval strength will be increased further. Principal

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aero-naval units already have been transferred from Brest to Toulon. The carriers Foch and Clemenceau, with their escorting cruisers and missile-launching frigates, with nuclear capacity, are being attached to Toulon, doubling the French naval force in the Mediterranean.

As explained by Giscard when he reviewed the French Mediterranean fleet in mid-July, international relations on a global scale revolve around two axes: on the East-West axis around the two superpowers and on the north-south axis between the industrialized countries of the north and the developing countries of the south.

The Mediterranean is the center of gravity, the point of intersection of these axes, he said, and there France intends to follow a policy called for by its traditions, its responsibilities and its interests. Hence the reorientation of French naval strength to the Mediterranean, where Giscard said half of the world's naval means are concentrated.

At the end of the Algerian war it seemed to the French that calm might reign in the Levant and that French naval forces would find the Atlantic more favorable to their deployment. Events, said Giscard, have shown the error of these predictions.

Because of its geopolitical situations on the shores of the Mediterranean and because of its economic and commercial dependence on maritime transportation on that sea, France must seek peace and stability in that area. For both political and economic-commercial reasons, France has, since de Gaulle, sought to strengthen its relations with the three Maghreb (Northwest African) states, with the Arab world as a whole and with black Africa.

From the economic-commercial point of view,

BOSTON GLOBE 15 AUGUST 1976 (16) Pg. 1

Assessing
that senior
US officialBy William Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — This is a story about the mysterious "senior US official" who for eight years has been globetrotting on Henry Kissinger's plane, issuing lofty pronouncements and opinions.

His authoritative observations — on issues of the day, on the prospects of sensitive negotiations, indeed on chances of war and peace — are taken most seriously by world leaders and the public in general.

What he is:

Witty, charming,

informative, liked,

misleading, abused,

cunning, protected

Thus he is one of the most powerful and influential men in the US government. But ground rules imposed on the dozen or so newsmen who travel with him forbid unmasking him by name and title.

This self-same "senior US official" was very much in evidence on Air Force Three, a specially fitted-out Boeing 707 jet when Secretary of State Kissinger made a recent eight-day jaunt, probably one of his last in high government office, to London; Teheran, Iran; Kabul, Afghanistan; Lahore, Pakistan; Deauville, France, and The Hague.

(See SENIOR OFFICIAL, Pg. 2-F)

of the 1500 merchant ships which daily operate on the Mediterranean, 1200 fly the flags of Western European states. French Mediterranean ports account for 40 percent of France's maritime traffic, and for over half of France's petroleum supplies. Being so largely dependent on the Red Sea and the Mediterranean for energy resources, France is increasingly sensitive to the danger of submarine attack which would cut her principal lines of supply.

It is vital, therefore, for France to keep the Mediterranean sea lanes open and to maintain the closest possible relations with the riparian nations. France's reorientation of its naval strength is thus entirely logical from a national point of view and, at the same time, adds, in a critical area, valuable strength to the position of NATO in any confrontation with the USSR. Yet it in no way conflicts with the basic French policy of national independence and maintenance of an autonomous defense capacity.

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EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

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SENIOR OFFICIAL -- CONTINUED

The official is to his accompanying press corps, informative, witty, charming, illusive, misleading, cunning, liked, distrusted, abused and protected, all in the course of a working trip abroad. He has raised the practice of manipulating the press to an art form of diplomacy.

Reporters know they are being used, but, to varying degrees, they tend to go along anyway, fascinated, spellbound, flattered to be so intimately associated with a man of such unusual intellect and style. These newsmen lash out in frustration, privately and occasionally in print or over the airwaves, at the duplicity of the official's approach. But they stop short of going so far as to risk a divorce of the relationship. It means too much to them personally and professionally.

Not since the heyday of President John Kennedy has any ranking American official been so adept at using the press for his public policy purpose.

On each Kissinger flight, reporters, Secret Service men and secretaries sit in the rear compartment, while Kissinger, other State Department officials and some wives sit in a forward compartment, which includes an airborne office and a sleeping suite.

The source is obviously well-informed, but there is no earthly way for reporters to check what he has just said--unless they happen to have some independent knowledge of the subject.

On each long flight between stops the "senior US official" customarily talks to reporters both formally, with all of them grouped round him in his office, and informally in conversations with a few at a time in the aisle in the rear section.

In the formal sessions, the official makes some statements, comments on some of their stories which offended or pleased him, and answers questions. Tape recorders are permitted in such briefings because the noise of the engines sometimes makes it hard to hear every word.

Thus, even though reporters are not permitted to quote the man by name, they can review his words by replaying the tapes back at their seats and then write their stories, portable typewriters cradled on their knees or on serving trays. The source is obviously well-informed, but there is no earthly way for the reporters to check what he has just said, unless they happen to have some independent knowledge on the subject.

On the flight from London to Teheran, for example, a newsman asked the official to comment on stories that the Russians on July 4 and July 29 had detonated nuclear devices that may have been of yields higher than permitted under a draft treaty on nuclear weapons tests.

He first disparaged the report as being politically motivated. Then he suggested the range of uncertainty was somewhere between 100 and 200 kilotons. The pact bans tests over 150 kilotons. If careful additional analysis, which was ordered after a meeting of the National Security Council's Verification Panel, showed the test was at the upper range, he said, the United States would do something, presumably demand an explanation from the Russians about the suspected violation of the spirit of the agreement.

Asked about the second test, which reportedly was larger than the first and was almost missed because it came minutes after an

earthquake in Russia, the official said he had seen no data on a second one.

This reporter happened, by chance, to have done some reporting on the subject in Washington a few days before and had been told on good authority that the first test ranged between 120 and 440 kilotons and the second was even larger. This wide gap of uncertainty was being analyzed, I had been told, to determine whether the Russians should have known such tests would register well above the agreed ceiling. The Globe story thus differed significantly from the one told on the plane.

On the flight from Teheran to Kabul, reporters were anxious to get some idea of the issues to be dealt with in Pakistan, the subsequent stop. The official expressed America's growing concern that a capability will spread to a number of nations to build nuclear weapons and stressed US displeasure with a French contract to build a nuclear fuel processing plant in Pakistan. Without tighter safeguards than now envisaged, he said, Pakistan could divert enriched uranium from the plant to build nuclear bombs as did its neighboring rival India.

He left the clear impression with reporters that he would warn Pakistani leaders that unless they backed out of the deal with France, or at least agreed to air-tight safeguards, the United States might deny the sale of 80 to 100 A7 medium bombers to Pakistan and might have to cut off economic aid under newly drafted Congressional legislation.

But in public statements in Lahore, Pakistan, Kissinger was at pains to stress that no threats were being made, military or economic, and that he "hoped the issue could be settled without confrontation." However, the earlier stories, inspired by the session on the plane, had served the purpose of sending a tougher signal.

On the flight to France, where the Kissingers planned to spend a day and a half relaxing on the estate of an English lawyer friend, the "senior US official" came to the rear of the plane to jestingly complain that because of their stories on the French-Pakistani deal they had managed to ruin his brief vacation. He jibed at them that when the plane landed he would have to say that American reporters had misrepresented his remarks and that their stories had been further misinterpreted by the French.

But he made no public statement of that sort on landing and many of the newsmen figured he had been pulling their leg, partly out of pique that they had not trusted his "word as a gentleman" that his visit to France was purely social and had shifted plans from waiting in Paris to move instead to a hotel in Deauville.

Press irritation exploded into anger the next day when reporters learned:

—That Kissinger had given an interview to two of their number when they wandered out to his estate.

—That the French foreign office had issued a statement saying the United States had apologized for the misimpressions created by erroneous stories.

A bus load of angry reporters descended on the estate, only to be mollified by public Kissinger assurances that no erroneous stories had been filed by reporters on the trip.

But too late. Two wire service reporters and one television newscaster had already dispatched stories tagging Kissinger as the source of the earlier, controversial account.

In fairness, it should be underscored that

(See SENIOR OFFICIAL, Pg. 3-F)

SENIOR OFFICIAL -- CONTINUED

much of what the official said on the plane was straightforward, informative, valuable and reasonable. But, at critical moments, it was not completely trustworthy.

And while frequently on the trip the official complained about partisan motivation behind various leaks, at one point he dropped a seemingly passing remark about the difficulty of assessing intelligence on Soviet weapons. He said that one such recent issue involving the Soviet Backfire bomber should be resolved in about three weeks.

Most of the reporters had no notion of what he was talking about, but several made marginal notes to check on it after returning to Washington. Apparently he was referring to a recent controversial study by McDonnell-Douglas engineers -- at the behest of the CIA -- on some new information on Backfire flights suggesting the plane might have shorter range than concluded in five lengthy previous studies. If word of that leaked out, it would help the Kissinger case against insisting on counting the Backfire as a strategic bomber under a prospective SALT-2 agreement.

As the Kissinger plane neared Washington, the senior official was in the aisle in shirtsleeves and stocking feet, having a largely political bull session with several reporters. "Would former President Nixon maintain a low political profile?"

If Jimmy Carter is elected and for some reason things fall apart, he responded, it's possible that Nixon will come forward and insist he was the last strong President.

The official revealed that a couple of people, working on Nixon's memoirs had interviewed Kissinger on certain key events. Asked whether he thought Kissinger could write an historically objective account of the major events in which he had played so central a role, he grew pensive.

No doubt it would be hard, the official said, but no good purpose would be served by a self-serving, one-sided attempt to explain away certain negative newspaper headlines. Kissinger, he said, would doubtless dictate his recollections of events and then search the record for corroboration.

Then he got very serious. "If this turns out to be the last trip, boys--" his voice trailed off and his eyes grew misty. He waved farewell and ambled back to the forward compartment.

On the ground at 9:30 p.m., the "senior US official" was last seen entering a long black limousine with Nancy Kissinger. But none of the reporters at planeside regarded that as a scandalous act.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 AUG 76 (16)

Greek-Turkish 'War' Is Verbal

The Greek-Turkish war of words over rights to resources under the Aegean Sea is continuing at the United Nations and elsewhere, but the threat of war between the two ancient enemies seems to have subsided as tentative steps for negotiation of the dispute have been taken.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger met yesterday with representatives of the two countries to try to get the negotiations started.

The present friction stems from the voyage of a Turkish survey ship near Greek islands. Greece claims the voy-

NEW YORK TIMES 15 AUGUST 1976 (16) Pg. 917

Shifting Aegean Winds

By C. L. Sulzberger

ATHENS—The external dangers of the persistently ugly Turkish-Greek quarrel are blatantly obvious: a threat to world peace and to NATO unity as well as to the complex of United States relationships with the volatile East Mediterranean. But there is also something inherently sad about the fact that this problem, which is in truth so needless and, stripped of emotional aspects, so capable of solution, should be hampering democracy's impressive progress here.

Just over two years ago Greece was still in the straitjacket of military dictatorship imposed by a conspiracy of colonels in 1967. In the wake of that inept regime's effort to seize Cyprus by an abortive coup, Turkey invaded the disputed island. The junta collapsed and Constantine Caramanlis, a previous Prime Minister, returned from his self-sought exile in Paris and restored democracy.

As he himself recounts the record, within 10 months free national and municipal elections had been held, a plebiscite whose results were unchallenged decided on a republican form of government to replace the refrigerated monarchy, a progressive constitution was approved and a president chosen—all without bloodshed. Greece suddenly possessed Free Europe's only strong government dominated by one majority party in Parliament and public opinion. Everywhere else coalition or minority cabinets ruled.

The army—pampered by the colonels it produced—had inadequate weapons and was deeply involved in politics; today it is properly equipped and boasts good discipline and high morale. Those of its leaders who had seized national power have been purged and the social structure was not upset thereby.

The economy was hauled out of a morass. In 1974 the growth in the G.N.P. was minus 2 percent. Last year it was 3 percent and this year it is expected to be 5 percent. The Government estimates 1976 inflation at between 10 and 12 percent.

The balance of payments crisis has vanished and, despite heavy defense expenditures (in hard currency installments), Greece no longer has to borrow. Unemployment during this year's first quarter is 37.4 percent less than for the same period of 1975.

Moreover, Mr. Caramanlis has crossed the threshold of Greece's great European dream by gaining acceptance as a member of the Common Market. He estimates it will take two to three years for complete admission and that the initial period, while this little

land's economy adjusts, will be difficult. Nevertheless, he says: "I have warned our industrialists and farmers: 'I am going to throw you into the sea and you will have to swim or sink.'"

This, then, is the picture as Greece teeters on the edge of fresh embroilment with Turkey in an argument that has persisted on and off for generations but was recently revived by the Cyprus and Aegean issues. The new political system is surprisingly stable, considering the volatile people it governs and its short duration.

The Republic's President has adequate executive powers—less than France's chief of state but more than West Germany's. He can exercise a veto, choose prime ministers, decide on plebiscites and influence long-range policy; he cannot intervene in day-to-day decisions.

The press, after seven years of dictatorial shackles, is free to the de-

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

gree of licentiousness. Political opposition speaks out boldly, especially the talented parliamentary orator Andreas Papandreou. But the opposition is divided; its lack of unity and responsibility is if anything a special weakness of the existing system.

Just prior to the latest, ongoing, crisis with Turkey—this one over mineral exploration of the continental shelf beneath the Aegean Sea—Mr. Caramanlis had earned considerable acclaim by offering the tarnished Olympic Games a permanent, nonpoliticized home—ancient Olympia itself, where the whole idea began. Greece was ready to finance a major share of the costs, probably through a long-term loan serviced by quadrennial profits from the competition.

Now, suddenly—tragic, but far from unusual in this passionate, changeable land—the picture of happy, democratic health has altered. A few days ago Mr. Caramanlis was confident his national and parliamentary majority was greater than ever as the free-thinking, free-speaking Greeks savored the additional pleasures of prosperity spiced with liberty.

But if the current confrontation develops badly—and in this part of the world anything can happen with utmost abruptness—how will the nation react? Last week the Prime Minister would confidently have bet on greater support than at any time since his return. The Greeks seemed to show overwhelming confidence in his leadership. Next week—who knows? That is the danger of unpredictable Aegean political winds.

age infringes on its rights to the seabed area; Turkey says the Greek claim to the seabed is invalid. The potential prize is a domestic oil supply for two oil-poor nations: Greece has already found oil in the area near Thasos.

Greece has asked the International Court of Justice at The Hague for an advisory opinion and has also taken its case to the United Nations Security

Council. The United States and other allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to which both Greece and Turkey are connected, welcomed the decision to argue the matter out in the international forums. That was preferable to the armed conflict that seemed at least possible as Greece and Turkey, their relations already strained by Cyprus, each made military preparations.

WASHINGTON STAR 15 AUGUST 1976 (16) Pg. B7

Eliot Janeway

Kissinger Acts In Role of Shah's Pawn

By Eliot Janeway

Special to The Washington Star

The "greasy pole" was Disraeli's half-respectful and half-contemptuous term for personal, political power. When FDR shinnied to the top of that pole, he found the press conference a nuisance but left it an institution. Today presidential candidates are under more pressure to show how they will perform at their press conferences than to explain away their sexual entanglements or to prove that they never signed up on Howard Hughes' team.

FDR handled his press conferences like a master showman. He treated the reporters as "straight men" and seized on their questions as an opportunity to steal their lines in playing to their audiences. Ethel Barrymore (Alice Longworth's ambassador to us Democrats) once explained to me, "President Roosevelt is a natural-born Barrymore who strayed into politics."

True to the tradition of master showmanship, FDR never relied exclusively on his own patter. Notwithstanding his reputation as "the champ," he always relied on a stage prop because he ran scared. His sidekick was his dog Fala. He brought down the house with an unforgettable punch-line delivered to his then-unprecedented mass radio audience: "My wife doesn't mind what they say about her, my children don't mind what they say about me, I don't mind what they say about me, but they attack my dog Fala and she minds."

Since FDR's time there have been three pretentious attempts to steal his thunder. Nixon acted out the first charade when as Ike's Veep he fought off the Feds and defended his first public liaison with Howard Hughes. As character witnesses Nixon invoked "Pat's good Republican cloth coat" and his dog Checkers. LBJ played Falstaff to Roosevelt's Prince Hal. Where Roosevelt played sympathy for Fala for all it was worth, Johnson used the White House lawn to hold up his dogs by the ears with the whole world looking.

On the theory that you can't have too much of a good thing, the friendly Shah of Iran has just improvised a third rendition of this sentimental sketch; this time it's a tragic outrage against public decency and American security. Last week he declared a toothless war against the United States at his Teheran press conference. The lap-dog at his side was none other than the indomitable lion of the cocktail circuit, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

The Romans had a term for this land of display and they were quite clear about the stakes they were playing for. They spoke of putting captured barbarians "under the yoke." Yoking is a mild euphemism

for the treatment the barbarian in Teheran gave Kissinger. Not even Chamberlain would have taken a comparable humiliation from Hitler at Berchtesgaden.

The New York Times reported that "the Secretary sat next to the Shah under a Picasso (and that) Mr. Kissinger said little during the conference and at times seemed annoyed at some of the questions asked." It noted that, at the end of the press conference, the secretary said the United States attached "great importance to relations with Iran as well as to the crucial role Iran plays in the security and balance of the whole area." The Times neglected to note that the market for Picassos is more conducive to raising ready cash for busted sellers than the oil market.

The thrust of the Shah's ultimatum was that the U.S. needs its Iranian connection more desperately than Iran needs its American arsenal — and that's going some. Kissinger's willingness to serve as the political counterpart of a spear-carrier in Aida was all the more remarkable because his presence gave comfort to this most demented of America's declared enemies. The explicit target of this attack was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee — the one committee with the constitutional power to ratify any of America's foreign policy dealings. There's no doubt that if President Ford had gotten word of this inappropriate exercise of Secretary Kissinger's giving aid and comfort to the enemy, he would have been upset, and even confused.

The specific provocation of the Shah's ire was the belated discovery by the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Nixon had given the Shah a secret go-ahead to go into the arms business with America the source of her arsenal. Senator Humphrey is the chairman of this subcommittee, and one of the most eloquent advocates of reciprocal disarmament. Ironically enough, only yesterday Kissinger was touting Humphrey up and down Embassy Row as the sure Democratic presidential nominee with whom he could work and on whom he could rely to keep foreign policy out of the upcoming political campaign.

The theme of the Shah's rhapsody in blackmail emphasized two propositions: The first, that Iran is a sovereign country. The second, that it has the right to turn the Middle East into a battle ground for an arms race, with America as its chosen accessory.

The Shah went on to offer Washington a series of ultimatums. The first was indicated by his warning that Iran needs and proposes to have a military inventory three times larger than it already has. The second suggested that if Washington refused to continue serving as his arsenal "there are many more sources available in the world just waiting for the moment for us to go and shop there."

He started out serving an ultimatum, and ended up seeking a trade-off: Oil for arms. (As my readers will recall, I have been writing for months that this would be the Shah's last defense.) He refused to recognize the basic market reality that offering a commodity for barter

means offering it at a discount. When he added, "but we are not that broke yet," he admitted that he had no bargaining power.

The French have formulated a pithy phrase to describe what happens when Europeans try to move in on Americans doing business in the Middle East: "Either we can't deliver or they don't pay." Only the feckless British would have blundered into the trap the Shah has set for them in his anxiety to put substance behind his bluster. If the British let their new windfall of orders from the Shah go to their heads, sterling will end up overvalued at a dollar.

The Shah, in admitting that Iran is more busted than liquid, invoked the rationalization that he is borrowing in order to play Dutch uncle to "India, Egypt, and many other African countries;" they are the non-paying clients for the oil he can't sell. In his present course he will be borrowing for himself; no cover-up about giveaways to countries which have already strained their credit will stand up.

Shakespeare could not have had the Shah in mind when he mocked a similar bit of noisy strutting as "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying nothing" — but the comparison is irresistible. With every shipment of American arms he receives the Shah has become more of a captive customer; he needs American follow-on accessories and replacement equipment, as well as American maintenance and training crews. Any serious effort to follow through on his bluff will endanger the return on his substantial American inventory. It will also subject his armed forces to the common plight suffered by all developing countries: non-standardization. The Shah runs the risk of being left not only as indigent as the other countries in the Third World relying on this strategy, but as impotent.

Recollections of Shakespeare suggest heroic undertakings. The Shah is scarcely a heroic figure; his antics recall one of the more sardonic quips of Molnar, the late Hungarian master of theatrical comedy. Molnar elevated being a Hungarian from a way of life to a profession. In this capacity he delivered himself of the punch line on which he made the most mileage. He tells us that "if you have a Hungarian for a friend, you don't need an enemy."

The Shah has figured out a way to be America's Hungarian — particularly, to be the CIA's Hungarian. If not for the CIA he would be an obscure refugee floating around Italian hotels. When the Dulles brothers were enjoying their inning of piety masking their dirty pool, they engineered the putsch that overthrew the popular national revolution led by Mossadegh and reinstalled the present regime as its puppet in Teheran. The name of that game was to make Ivan safe for the American oil companies and to force the then still-important British oil interest to share the wealth with them.

At the time Dick Heims was the up and coming CIA wonder-boy. Predictably, he is now Kissinger's operative on the spot in Teheran — by virtue of being our ambassador. With such representation, we don't need enemies.